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I
D uring my fieldwork in the countrysideof Taiwan, I used to introduce myself
as a PhD student who was doing fieldwork
there. My fieldwork site was a very interest-
ing and unique place. Within one small coun-
tryside township there were many varied situ-
ations. Different religions (Taiwanese popular
religion, Presbyterian, Catholic, Buddhist,
Yıguàn Dào), different ethnic groups (Minnan,
Hakka, mainland Chinese, people coming from
Southeast Asia) and different political orienta-
tions coexisted in the same place.
From an economic point of view, it was in-
teresting to see how these religious and ethnic
differences disappeared. Intensive agriculture
was the most important way of subsistence.
Sharing agricultural machineries or physical
labour was a common practice among local
farmers. This “mutual help” promoted contact
between people and families, and helped to
increase mutual knowledge and respect. The
relationships between people were not exclu-
sively based on religious or ethnic membership,
but instead were built by the interweaving of
many factors.
This explains why many people invited my
wife and me to every kind of religious festi-
val, even though they knew very well that we
were Catholics. In fact, as a Catholic church-
goer I regularly attended the weekly celebra-
tion at the church, but many friends (of course
not Catholics) invited me several times to take
part in their temple festivals or other religious
activities. At that time I was collecting mate-
rial for a possible PhD project. I was there-
fore always bringing my camera with me. It
became common to see a foreign guy look-
ing around for interesting pictures during tem-
ple festivals or other ceremonies. On account
of – I think – the size of my camera, I was
invited many times to temple festivals or to
attend funerals to take pictures of the per-
formers. On one occasion, a friend invited us
to attend a Yıguàn Dào meeting. The mean-
ing of these Chinese characters is Consistent
Way or Persistent Way. Yıguàn Dào is a Chi-
nese folk religious sect that emerged from the
Xiantian Dào (Way of Former Heaven) tra-
dition in the late 19th century, in Shandong,
to become China’s most important redemp-
tive society in the 1930s and 1940s, especially
during the Japanese invasion (Ownby 2015,
702–703). In present day Taiwan, this reli-
gion very often embodied almost all the deities
known in the Orient: Buddha, Lao-tze, Je-
sus Christ, Muhammad, and so on. Because
of this, Yıguàn Dào is one of the bigger “in-
stitutionalized” religions of Taiwan (Lu 2008).
Our friend invited us hoping that knowing her
religion could be helpful for my research.
We arrived at the Yıguàn Dào temple in
the morning. Although their meeting had al-
ready started, many people and especially the
leader of the local community (a kind of mas-
ter) were waiting for us. After the exchange of
some pleasantries, we were invited to take part
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in a lesson being given in the main room. We
thus entered a big room where a sixty-year-
old woman was delivering a speech about fil-
ial piety. She was stressing the pain of moth-
ers during their sons’ birthdays. The audience,
who was paying great attention to the words of
the woman, constantly answered her frequent
questions and cried with her, probably upset
by the disrespectful conduct of the younger
generations. The only thing that was partic-
ularly out of tune was the presence, in the row
of chairs in front of me, of two fourteen-year-
old guys, who were playing and laughing to the
great disappointment of the master, who was
sitting at my side.
Briefly speaking, the meeting was a display
of the traditional values of Confucianism re-
garding filial piety, respect for elders, and so
on. The performance’s main goal was to stim-
ulate deep emotion in the audience. Another
important point was the constant repetition of
teachings based on the above-mentioned val-
ues. Anyway, that day the best was yet to
come.
After this lesson, and after a lunch with
a selected group of Yıguàn Dào believers, the
master invited us to drink a cup of tea in his of-
fice. At this point a man introduced himself as
someone holding an important position within
Yıguàn Dào. He persistently began inviting us
to Qiúdào (pray the Dao) in order to be saved.
I tried to explain to him that since I believed in
another religion, and did not know from what
or whom I should be saved, I preferred not to
do it. At this point the man began trying to
persuade me of the importance of praying the
Dao. The astonishing thing (at least for me)
was the stories he used in order to support his
plea. The stories he told us were a combina-
tion of traditional Taiwanese popular religious
beliefs and material evidence, such as pictures
and personal experiences, of the reincarnation
cycle. So that the reader may understand his
kind of approach, I am going to relate one of
the stories narrated to my wife and me by this
man:
“A friend of mine was a lunch box seller.
He specialized in selling chicken legs with rice.
One day I told him to change his business,
because he was killing living beans. He an-
swered that because of his age and low level of
education, he could not do any other kind of
job. My friend carried on with his business un-
til he decided to take a rest and make a trip
to another country. Unfortunately the plane he
took crashed. When I went to see the body of
my friend and that of his wife, I was shocked.
Both the bodies were intact, but without legs.
This must have happened because he was sell-
ing chicken legs.”
Confronted with this kind of story (on that
day I listened to more than thirty, at least), my
reaction was one of complete and clear refusal.
I started to think “how can these people hope
to convince me with this kind of story”? On
account of my resistance and hilarity, the man
finally – they were the longest three hours of
my life – desisted from pursuing the project of
our conversion.
Thinking about this experience, I can af-
firm that the dialogue between me (a West-
erner, training anthropologist, and Catholic
faithful) and the other person (a fifty-year-old
Taiwanese man born and raised in an environ-
ment of Taiwanese popular religion) was a dia-
logue between the deaf. There was an obvious
lack of communication between the two par-
ties and – as I believe – between the two cul-
tural systems. We can talk about systems be-
cause the two religious doctrines (Catholic and
Yıguàn Dào) offer a clear and well-defined vi-
sion of this world as well as the other one, and
consequently a concrete understanding of life
and of the relationships between persons. The
result was that, on the one hand, I complained
about his way of thinking and I thought that
he was telling nothing but stories full of super-
stitions. On the other hand, he was trying to
persuade me with his more sacred repertoire,
without any effect. What I considered super-
stition was only his cultural system. What he
considered stupid obstinacy in front of so much
evidence was just my cultural background.
In the following pages I will try to ana-
lyze how the “native anthropologist” performs
his research. In a successive step I will use
these observations to express my opinion about
how both Romanticism and the Enlightenment
have influenced anthropology, and in particu-
lar the anthropologist.
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II
The native anthropology of Western cosmol-
ogy has already been discussed – in a mas-
terly fashion – by Marshall Sahlins. In his
paper written for the Sidney W. Mintz lec-
ture in 1994, Sahlins told us how the Western
way of thinking is deeply influenced by Judeo-
Christian concepts about man and the Cos-
mos. In particular, he stressed how the Judeo-
Christian dogma of human imperfection must
be considered the main and basic element of
the discourse of the social sciences (Sahlins
1996, 395).
The Judeo-Christian tradition (which con-
siders humanity’s state to be a result of origi-
nal sin) is embedded in the entire Western way
of thought. Consequently, it has influenced all
the disciplines which were born under the in-
fluence of the Western sphere of thought. Thus
the social sciences are not immune to this “orig-
inal sin”.
The tendency of men to congregate with
each other is just one of the consequences of
original sin. In order to satisfy the needs cre-
ated by the exile from Eden, men began to
stay together. Society became a super-organic
entity (Durkheim), and this concept deeply in-
fluenced anthropological theories as a certain
functionalism that, as Sahlins argues, was an-
other legacy of the enlightened Adamic the-
ory, especially as “function” was collapsed into
“purpose” for the satisfaction of needs.
In this respect, Malinowski’s reduction of
culture to corporeal needs was a pedantic elab-
oration of Enlightenment social science. The
main advance achieved by Radcliffe-Brown’s
structural-functionalism was the transposition
of the same paradigm to society as a whole,
that is, by conceiving the social totality as an
organism, a biological individual, whose insti-
tutions responded in effect (function) and form
(structure) to its life needs (Sahlins 1996, 399).
In a subsequent step, Sahlins takes into
consideration the duality between body and
soul. Both Saint Paul and Saint Augustine
stressed that this was one of the consequences
of original sin. Sahlins found this dichotomy
inside the work of Durkheim, where the hu-
man being is, on the one hand, a pre-social
and sensuous animal, egocentrically given to
his own welfare, and on the other hand a so-
cial creature, able to submit his self-interest
to the morality of the society (Sahlins 1996,
402). A large part of anthropological thought
was built on this basic idea, from Morgan and
Frazer (with their evolutionary concept of cul-
ture) through Malinowski (with his obsessive
use of the term “savage”), and even Mead (at
least the Mead of Sex and Temperament in
Three Primitive Societies). At the very begin-
ning there was a body – such as the biblical
story of Adam – and then God “blew into his
nostrils the breath of life, and so man became
a living being”, giving rise to culture (Gen 2:7).
The only anthropologist who looked at this
problem from another perspective was Geertz
(1973). He affirmed that human nature as
we know it has been determined by culture.
Therefore, the supposed temporal precedence
of human biology relative to culture is incor-
rect (Sahlins 1996, 403).
The concepts of power or providence (of
course in terms of their relationships with
anthropology) are also sifted by the author.
Power, in particular, is analyzed beginning
with the observations of Augustine in The City
of God, where he affirmed that “Earthly rule
has been appointed by God for the benefit of
nations, so that, under the fear of human rule,
men may not devour one another like fishes ...”.
Whether it came about through Divine Provi-
dence (Augustine) or human reason (Hobbes),
men were thus able to suppress their enmity,
creating the institution of the state (Sahlins
1996, 405). The unity of natural laws and Di-
vine Providence – God could not have made
the universe as disorderly as it might seem in
everyday experience – shows the structure of
governance (in other words the hierarchy) as a
natural and direct effect of providence.
Therefore, these “structures” were thought
out by Western philosophers in a confusing
way, especially as regards their origins, too of-
ten conflated with the origin of society. The
easy supposition, after this construction, is
that a society without hierarchical structures
cannot be considered a society, or at least we
should look at it as a not-yet-evolved society.
What is more relevant to the topic I would
like to analyze is what Sahlins calls “anthropol-
ogy of reality” (Sahlins 1996, 411), or in other
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words the invention of a pure object world. Ac-
cording to Sahlins it was Christianity (and be-
fore it Judaism) that first disenchanted nature,
rendering it merely an object for humankind.
The ancient bond between man and nature was
destroyed, and in this way the Judeo-Christian
tradition distinguished itself from “paganism”,
which is considered to be precisely the idolatry
of nature. As Sahlins reminds us, “The deifi-
cation of nature was seen as the real essence
of paganism by both Christians and Jews”
(Sahlins 1996, 411). This is in my view a basic
concept: “natural” and “supernatural” are irre-
mediably separated, nature is only res extensa
made of nothing, lacking subjectivity. With-
out subjectivity, nature must be controlled and
dominated by the only presence that can play
the role of subject – man.
Other scholars support the thesis that in-
side the Western tradition, a large and clear
fracture has occurred between man and na-
ture. One of them is Todorov, who argued
that the conquest of America heralded and
established the present identity of Europeans
(Todorov 1984, 5). Referring to the event of
the conquest of America, Todorov wrote the
following:
In reporting on and analyzing the history of the con-
quest of America, I have been led to two apparently
contradictory conclusions. In order to speak of forms
and kinds of communication, I have, first of all, adopted
a typological perspective: the Indians favour exchanges
with the world, the Europeans exchanges between men.
Neither is intrinsically superior to the other, and we al-
ways need both at once; if we win on only one level,
we necessarily lose the other. (Todorov 1984, 252)
Yet Todorov adds:
In European civilization, logos has conquered mythos;
or rather, instead of polymorphous discourse, two ho-
mogeneous genres have prevailed: science and every-
thing related to it derive from systematic discourse,
while literature and its avatars practice narrative dis-
course (Todorov 1984, 283)
In other words, within the European civ-
ilization debate (here we can consider Euro-
pean as synonymous with Western), commu-
nication between men was overly emphasized.
As a result, Europeans have lost their rela-
tionship with the world and with the super-
natural world, no longer knowing how to en-
gage in a dialogue with it. The central point
of Todorov’s thought is that Logos defeated
Mythos. In the Western tradition there has
been a progressive destruction of Mythos. I
consider Todorov to be correct in his thinking,
and I believe this destruction has been progres-
sive and inevitable. We can discover the steps
of this destruction in Western history.
First of all, great importance must be as-
signed to the Lutheran Reformation. Since
the Reformation, it has been possible to
study, interpret, and make an exegesis of the
Holy Scriptures, which means to study and
(re)interpret all knowledge up to that moment.
It is important to remember that thanks to
the large work Summa Theologica of Thomas
Aquinas, the Catholic tradition was built,
weighed and put in communion with the Clas-
sical tradition, particularly through the works
of Aristotle. This created the basis for a com-
plete and well-defined vision of humanity, the
world, and the universe. In medieval times, the
whole store of human knowledge was based on
Holy books. Separating itself from the inter-
pretation of the Church and translating the
Bible into a language finally understandable
by common people, the Lutheran Reformation
formed the basis for a radical and unstoppable
change in all of human knowledge.
Another step in this direction was the in-
vention of movable-type printing and the me-
chanical printing press by Gutenberg around
1439. Up to then, all books were handwritten
by an amanuensis: a religious person who lived
inside convent-libraries such as the one por-
trayed by Umberto Eco in his The Name of
the Rose. Through the invention of the print-
ing press, knowledge left the convents and be-
came public (at least for some social classes),
increasing the development of European cul-
tural discourse and accelerating social changes.
In addition, the Copernican revolution and
the discoveries of Galileo irremediably de-
stroyed the medieval concept of the universe,
where the Earth was at the centre, put there
by Divine will. The accusation of the Church
against Galileo was that by rejecting Aris-
totelian and Ptolemaic theories, modern sci-
ence put itself in open and evident conflict not
only with the Holy scriptures, but also with
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the entire conception of the world and human
life at that time. A conception that, as men-
tioned above, was based on Holy scriptures and
on the interpretation that the Church made of
them. As the Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger said:
The Church at the time of Galileo kept much more
closely to reason than did Galileo himself, and she
also took into consideration the ethical and social con-
sequences of Galileo’s teaching. Her verdict against
Galileo was rational and just, and the revision of this
verdict can be justified only on the grounds of what is
politically opportune. (Ratzinger 1994, 98)
At this point, Western philosophical
thought was ready to understand what
Descartes said about nature: that it is only a
mechanism. In contrast, Pascal – the deeply
Christian and anti-Cartesian Pascal – defined
nature as deaf and voiceless. God was expelled
from his creation and this expulsion opened
the doors, with the help of Darwin, to the com-
plete overthrow of the Western cultural sys-
tem. The creation of the world by God and,
more importantly, the creation of men was not
the work of God, but instead was a result of
the causal factor of natural selection. With his
theory of evolution, Darwin provides a logical
and rational explanation for the diversity of
life. The consequence of this was the exclusion
of all irrationality present in nature, including
it inside a “causal factor”.
In sum, the Western way of thinking or,
to use an anthropological term, cosmology, has
completely changed during the time period be-
tween the end of the Middle Ages and the Mod-
ern era. Throughout these series of progressive
changes there has been a progressive expulsion
of the idea of the supernatural, magical, reli-
gious, and irrational from Western cosmology.
All these factors have become elements that
can be scientifically confuted and explained. In
other words, what happened between the end
of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the
so-called Modern age? Giacomo Leopardi1 has
identified what happened as the “incendiary,
destructive and auto-destructive use of scien-
tific reason”.
1 1798–1837, Italian philosopher, philologist and
poet.
What is nowadays considered normal and
natural in the West (at least for most people) is
only the result of scientific thought, according
to which, for example, water is just H2O and
not also humble, precious and chaste (Saint
Francis of Assisi). To paraphrase Nietzsche’s
words: “God is dead. God remains dead. And
we have killed him.”
It is undeniable that this is the main way of
thinking in anthropology, from its beginnings
until today. This represents, in my view, the
real, deep, and intrinsic presence of Western
thought in anthropology. The fact that anthro-
pology as a social science is taught all over the
world does not change the intimate reality of
things: anthropology is a Western science.
III
However, what happens when anthropologists
meet people belonging to different cultures and
cosmologies that are not founded on Enlight-
enment theories? In my view, the example by
which I began this piece could be a good start-
ing point in order to understand this kind of
“encounter”. In the example that begins this
article, there is a clear “I” (myself, the anthro-
pologist) and a clear “other”. In order to ac-
quire a full understanding of this episode, it
seems to me necessary to describe, in a very
concise way, some basic points of Chinese cos-
mology, the “other” – of course from my point
of view – cosmology.
The decision to analyze this example lies in
the fact that even if perhaps it is not a univer-
sal example, it is undoubtedly mine. Therefore,
I am able to explain and analyze many of the
cultural aspects involved in it.
First of all, we must say that in the Han
world there are some extremely old concepts,
like the concept of Hún and Pò. As Yu Ying-
shih (1987) explained, these concepts are very
old, probably existing before the arrival of
Buddhism in China.
Every man possesses three Hún or souls.
When a man dies, his three Hún move in three
different directions. One will end in the tomb
with the body, one in the ancestors’ tablet, and
the last one goes to a king of purgatory. In
addition to these Hún, a man also possesses
seven Pò or spirits. These Pò, especially those
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of children, are very sensible. They can eas-
ily get scared or even taken away by the Guıˇ
(ghosts). This is visible in certain behaviours
of many Taiwanese people. For instance, when
a baby urinates during the night, the mother
cannot change his clothes. Since during the
night the Pò moves away from the body of the
baby, if it comes back and does not recognize
his clothes, it may keep going around looking
for his body. If, during this time, a ghost cap-
tures it, the loss of the Pò will cause physical
and psychological problems to the baby. For
the same reason people believe that the face
of the child should be washed before he sleeps.
Another belief prevents mothers from bringing
their children outside after sunshine because
that is the moment when ghosts begin to go
outside.
Men and spirits (ancestors, ghosts, or
deities) physically share the same living space,
the same living time. They also share the same
preoccupations and corporeal needs. This be-
lief is expressed by the Chinese proverb: “The
same service to the dead as to the living; to the
absent as to the present” (Shì sˇı rú shì sheng,
shì wáng rú cún).
As Francis Hsu noted in his Under the An-
cestors’ Shadow :
The attitude of the living toward the dead and that of
the living are functionally one. The relationship of the
living with the dead is essentially modelled upon that
of the living with the living. In glorifying the dead, it
is both idealized and sets the standard and pattern for
kinship relationship. (Hsu 1967, 245)
The presence of ancestor worship gave par-
ents an additional incentive to have sons to
perform the rites, and thus secure for their
parents and grandparents eternal life. “There
are three things which are unfilial”, says Men-
cius, “and to have no posterity is the greatest of
them” (Bùxiào yoˇusan, wú hòu wéi dà). Given
this complex net of relationships, it is possible
to say that those who already left, who live in,
and who will live in this world, share the same
time, the same space and the same needs. In
other words, these categories live in an eter-
nal present or, to change the perspective, in
an eternal past. Because the relationships be-
tween these categories are complex, the inter-
action between who lives and who is already
dead (whether she/he is an ancestor, a ghost,
or a deity) is very strong and real for Taiwanese
people. In the Taiwanese world, to talk about
natural and supernatural in Western terms is,
at least, reductive.
The relationships between supernatural be-
ings and living people are, for most Taiwanese
people, physical and direct. There are lots of
supernatural beings who can let a person feel
their presence.
It is important to note that these concepts
are felt to be real by most Taiwanese people.
The ways in which contemporary Taiwanese
people manage these relationships are quite of-
ten the same as those followed by Chinese peo-
ple of two or three thousand years ago. What I
mean is that the cosmology of the Han people
(at least here in Taiwan) was not as affected
by revolutionary changes as in the West. Or
maybe it would be more correct to affirm that
the changes that of course occurred over such
a long period (and that, for example, created
a syncretism of Buddhism, Taoism and Con-
fucianism) did not change the primary, fun-
damental conceptions about the world and af-
terworld. Otherwise, after such a long time,
and after the Taiwanese educational system
has been opened to Western sciences, no peo-
ple would continue to burn paper money for
hungry ghosts at least twice a month.
Now, how does the “Western” anthropolo-
gist put himself in front of this world? I think
that a good situation was described by Melford
Spiro who, talking about Buddhism in Burma,
describes how:
Buddhism after all is not the creation of contemporary
Buddhists, but a religion with deep historical roots. Al-
though anthropological studies of non-literate societies
have converted a methodological necessity (the ignor-
ing of history) into a theoretical virtue (the theory of
functionalism). (Spiro 1982, 4)
In the following pages I will argue that a
“theoretical virtue” is born not only through
a lack of historical roots, but also – and
principally – through a lack of metaphysical
thought in anthropology. As I have already
shown above, this lack of the supernatural is
the result of a historical and philosophical pro-
cess that occurred in Western thought. For
the “native anthropologist”, the native people’s
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religion is ontologically false because all super-
natural entities are nonexistent. As a conse-
quence of this, the anthropologist should look
for a logical and rational explanation of human
behaviour in other and more rational fields (so-
ciety, politics, economics, and even culture).
What I am trying to explain is that the En-
lightenment conception of the world has forged
and moulded the method of the discipline.
IV
Let us discuss the last point of this paper:
how Romanticism and the Enlightenment in-
fluenced anthropology, and in particular the
anthropologist. It is certainly true that Ro-
manticism had a great influence on anthropol-
ogy, especially American anthropology. This is
particularly true since Boas became the cen-
tral scholar of the discipline. As we know, Boas
was a German scholar, and it is reasonable that
some concepts such as nation, culture, and na-
tionality (with all their declensions) have a
common root which can be found inside the
German Romantic tradition.2
I picked up some of these basic concepts
hoping that it would be useful for a deeper
and more complete understanding:
“Subjectivism and individualism”: Due to the lack of
Enlightenment reason, the approach to the under-
standing of nature is no longer unique and unam-
biguous. The knowledge of nature becomes a sub-
jective product of personal experience. (Subjectivism,
Merriam-Webster)
“Romanticism and nation”: The celebration of the na-
tion (defined in its language, history and cultural char-
acter) as an inspiring ideal for artistic expression; and
the instrumentalization of that expression in political
consciousness-raising. (Leerssen 2013, 28)
It is hard to deny that the above-mentioned
points are present in the Boas idea of cultural
anthropology. Boas argued that in order to un-
derstand the specific cultural traits of a people
(behaviours, beliefs, and symbols), we must ex-
amine them within their local context. He also
2 It may be useful to clarify that the term ‘Ro-
manticism’ embodies in itself different meanings. While
the German Romantisch evokes literary images of me-
dieval landscapes and memories, the English Romantic
is linked with feeling and love.
believed that since people migrate from one
place to another, and since the cultural con-
text changes over time, the elements of a cul-
ture (and their meanings) will change. There-
fore, Boas emphasized the importance of local
histories for an analysis of cultures.
It follows that each people must have its
own culture (Ruth Benedict will elaborate on
this, affirming that each people has its own
personality), and the culture of a specific peo-
ple is unique and unrepeatable.
Up to this point, I think nobody could
doubt that American anthropology has been
influenced by some ideas of the Romantic
movement. Nevertheless, what I want to try
to argue is that such a Manichean division and
distinction between Romanticism and the En-
lightenment (in particular regarding their in-
fluence on the anthropological world) is dan-
gerous and misleading for an understanding of
the method of anthropology.
As I have tried to demonstrate in the pre-
vious paragraphs, I am deeply persuaded that
the method of anthropology is an enlightened
method, irrespective of which “school” it be-
longs to. Anthropology, as a science, elimi-
nated all the supernatural beings that formed
a fundamental part of the Romantic move-
ment. This fact, in my view, has influenced
the anthropological method so much – and so
intrinsically – that it is impossible for anthro-
pologists to discuss religious experiences with
natives without disbelieving them, or to use a
more polite expression, without putting these
religious experiences within a social, psycho-
logical, or political context. As science, anthro-
pology must have a reference to the discipline
(literature review), a strong theory (otherwise
your piece will only be a folkloric essay), em-
pirical data (fieldwork) and a thesis (even if
it would sometimes be more logical to call it
an antithesis), and make a reasonable contri-
bution to the discipline (scientific discussion).
The unity of humanity is guaranteed, as-
sured and ratified by this method of research
which, as a scientific method, considers the
subjects of its research (humanity) to be the
same thing. Submitting all the people to the
same method of research, anthropology is un-
able to take into consideration many, often ir-
rational, aspects embodied by a culture.
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We can use a metaphor and take as an ex-
ample the work of one of the fathers of German
Romanticism, Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe.
In his famous masterpiece Faust, we can see
that the bet between God and the Devil, made
to the detriment of Doctor Faust, disappears
inside the anthropological method. The an-
thropologist’s Faust would be a victim of some
complex social or economic changes and of his
intrinsic “Germanicity” (culture and personal-
ity), or maybe he would be a victim of a cul-
tural structure or a complex symbolic system
that would determine his actions.
This lack of the supernatural inside anthro-
pology is the link that connects Romanticism
with the Enlightenment and, as I have shown
above, moulds the method, scope, and very na-
ture of anthropology itself.
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